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Influence Small State Force Design

by

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INFLUENCE SMALL STATE FORCE DESIGN

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Small states make decisions based on historical lessons from what worked previously in fulfilling their security needs. Security and defense are related but not the same. A state's national security apparatus makes decisions based upon the need for security. A competition for resources and a search for concepts that successfully addresses challenges, threats, and risks is ongoing. Using capability based planning as an analytical tool, the design of armed forces has to answer to many expectations and not all of them related to military. A flexible building block approach seems to provide a practical tool. Force design, taking into account its own logic and relationships, should merge capability based planning and the building block approach. The command and control system has to link the capabilities requirement with the modular approach in an effective way. Different tradeoffs have to be made but it is still advisable to use capability based planning and modularity for force design of small nations.

INFLUENCE SMALL STATE FORCE DESIGN

The last decade challenged us with a pace of change in many different areas of the world. The so called Arab Spring, the War on Terror, Iranian nuclear aspirations, financial challenges, and others, tell us that the environment is Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA). No one nation can address all the security issues alone and a whole of government, or better to say whole of governments approach, is needed to address them. While the military is only one of the tools in the mentioned approach, its utility is not diminishing. However the question remains for all nations, how to develop, organize, and apply military force in these circumstances. The challenge for small nations is even bigger. The small state design of armed forces cannot take into account all capabilities needed for the full spectrum of threats (responses) in the today strategic environment. On the other hand, the design of the armed forces of a small nation has to take into account the wider context and requirements of the military and operational environment (theater) in which the force will operate. This should include membership in formal alliances, temporary coalitions, and relationships with neighbors, as well as economic, demographic, and even geographic factors.

Small state force design meaning the specification of the size and type armed forces a nation needs, is manifested by the nation's leadership (national security strategy), must be intended to accomplish national security goals in a particular environment, using a set of (building blocks) components, satisfying a set of (defense) requirements, subject to constraints.[1] This paper will study the qualitative and quantitative implications being a small state has on security and defense decision making. Further the study will approach the national decision making apparatus and its

motivations for decisions that drive force design. Capability planning methodology will be presented as one of the possible analytical tools for small nations in addressing future needs as perceived today. Modularity will be analyzed to address capability needs of a small state. Capabilities and modularity are linked under the overarching requirements of the command and control concept. After analyzing the process of force design with its internal implications, relations, and tradeoffs, an answer to what a force design process should do will be provided. Comments on the way forward will conclude the study. Everything starts with two words: small state.

Small States

Size matters. From the institutional point of view, great powers are those in charge of the international system and they may shape international institutions accordingly. This institutional privilege is seen in the composition of the United Nations Security Council and the extra voting power in the Breton Woods institutions. On the other hand international institutions make the effect of resource based power visible. International institutions require justification through formalization of norms and rules for the use of power. This is the primary reason why small states value the area of international law and regime where even small states have a say. Today out of 193 members[2] of the United Nations all but one or two dozen fall in the category of small state. Beginning with the Congress in Vienna (Westphalian state system) it is obvious that the bigger powers coexisted uneasily with the principle of the formal equality of sovereign states. Specifically with small ones.

Small states can be defined by a quantitative lack of power with dimensions such as population size, geographical area and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[3] For example in Europe the Netherlands was defined as a small state with a population of 16

million inhabitants.[4] Other sources have defined mini and micro states with thresholds of a million or 100.000 inhabitants respectively but while this statistic is useful it is both arbitrary and inadequately defined.[5] In the area of defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses a percentage of military and civilian personnel in contrast to the labor force of the state in comparison.[6]

Some authors call out the economy as a special category. For example, NATO uses the percentage of GDP for defense expenditure and its distribution to personnel, equipment, infrastructure, and other needs as a bench mark.[7] Further the financial indicators show defense expenditure per capita. GDP spent on defense measures overall indicates the level of effort regardless of where it is spent. In collective defense, the principle of burden sharing is applied to try and answer the question if a state is a participant, a consumer, or a contributor of security and defense.[8] Maurice East finds that small states don't all use the same generic metrics for this decision but prefer to initiate actions with other states by combining multiple metrics with economic issues being more important.[9]

A group of small states can be treated differently based on geostrategic interests. Even if states are equal in size and are neighbors, the environment makes them different. For example Benelux, Finland, Norway and Denmark were pushed into World War II (WWII); on the other hand since the great powers of the time didn't have an interest on Sweden, Turkey, Switzerland or Portugal, they were not so compelled. Some states are not part of the society of states because of their perceived or real lack of resources (San Marino and Monaco weren't part of the League of Nations because they didn't have an army). One could conclude that a state that does not fulfill the

expectations for a small state is then considered a micro state. It would be wrong to imply that a small state is a weak state. Small states leverage their influence and "power" differently, and many times from inside alliances. This is why qualitative factors must be also observed. Qualitative criteria define the state in the context of the state system that is arguably a relevant factor in determining the size of its units.[10]

Small State Use of "Power" and Relationship

Sovereignty is not only associated with the capacity to take action to control a states own territory, but also its ability to influence the larger international environment. This is a linkage between security and other national policies. The problem of this term is that it may reflect the overall weakness of the governmental control.[11] Small states can be defined by a qualitative lack of power. In reality, to balance their capacity, small states use different tools. The term may also portray a lack of power to be used in international affairs.[12] Some states may possess great issue specific power. Switzerland is a financial power, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are oil powers. The study of Diana Panke on small EU states that have to cope with structural disadvantages, defines 19 states (of 27) to be small based on lower than average political power (Political power means less than average votes in the Council of Ministers under qualified majority rule of 12.78 votes).[13]

Individual, institutional, and management preferences are built on values. Nations, even if they are neighbors and share a common history, have different tolerance of ambiguity, like in the case of Belgium and Denmark.[14] The issue is not only what is in common to the small states but also what kind of factor does culture play.[15] The roles of the social game point out national culture differences in relation to authority, concept of self, and ways of dealing with conflicts. These factors play an

important part in building a national security strategy and relationships. The question is more about the willingness to use the military instrument of national power and the motivations behind dealing with security issues. That implies that there are strategies attacking incapacity to guarantee their own security.

There are strategies that help prevent or reduce the consequences of smallness and scarcity like increased interdependence, selective foreign policy, specialization or avoidance of foreign involvement.[16] Small states concentrate their capacity to achieve intended effects with the inclusion of wider criteria as expressed with the recent notion of “soft power”.[17] Particular foreign policy behavior and the size of a state can be correlated but a causal connection has not been established.[18] Studies that rely on behavioral patterns and voluntary strategies concentrate on prevention of external sensitivity (factors influencing this sensitivity include the international system hierarchy, hegemony, and balance of power) and tension and establishment of norms and qualities.[19]

From the studies of small states the concept of bandwagoning or balancing emerged.[20] When we discuss capabilities a problem arises at the start of the analysis. We should be able to identify structural preconditions. Many studies rely on the difference in power relating only to military power omitting other factors. Small states can be nonpermanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), contact groups, and contribute in the field of international law, peacekeeping or others. Some are part of alliances. They are trying to enhance their security with partnership.[21] The perceived security threats are then different and lie more in the field of political opportunities. When in an alliance the question is always about exploitation of the large

by the small (bandwagoning). Therefore a state chooses an alliance or neutrality depending on whether it believes that alliances possess too great a risk of involvement or it believes that international cooperation is necessary to protect its security.[22]

This leads to the conclusion that there is no internationally established definition (or one agreed to by academia) for a small state.[23] The only existing measure is that a small state also must fulfill Customary International law from the 1933 Montevideo convention in that they must have a territory, permanent population, government in control and be willing to participate in international relations.[24] In international relations every state assesses the burden of the contribution in each and every relationship. Relational factors must be applied when we compare quantitative measures.[25] Two aspects of smallness condition small power behavior, whatever the system. These are the need to rely on outside sources to solve any security dilemma and the narrow margin of safety in the environment that the small state possesses. Borders are becoming less meaningful today as the EU demonstrates. Even territory is becoming less meaningful as is seen in NATO. Communication, transport, liberalization of goods, services, capital, and people are more important.[26] In practice this is observable in empirical statehood practices that precede juridical decision, as was the case with some states of former Yugoslavia, or what is happening today with Kosovo. It is also true that size is a social construct and that there is not one defined standard to draw the line between small and big countries.[27] Even today in some circumstances small states are considered as objects and not the subject of international relations. Peter Beahr concluded that the concept of small state is not a useful analytical tool.[28] Dan Reiter in his study confirmed that, from a Realist approach (Alliances), learning is the main

driving factor for small state security decision making.[29] Even an external threat has a marginal effect. Learning lessons from the past is the primary factor bearing on policy alignment. This is not the case for the big states that care for the consistency of their interests and shift them very carefully. If learning was the predominant driving force to establish the security and military apparatus of yesterday we should research how the political and executive apparatus is influenced and works today. The issue that security planning is driven by power holders must be explained.

National Security

A comprehensive application concept developed by Barry Buzan is one of multisectoral security where security is not defined in objective terms but in relation to some perceived dynamic of state affairs. This also implies there is likely more to security than a pure balance of power. Perceived security challenges can be grouped into five sectors: military, political, social, economic and environmental. These sectors can be found in documents of small and big nations, allied or non aligned countries as well as collective defense organizations. The executive national security apparatus is seen as distinct from the elected political decision makers and from the informed and broader set of interested opinion leaders, pressure groups and defense intellectuals. Basically the national executive apparatus is seen as a black box supporting elected political decision makers in the process of identifying security challenges and developing and implementing ways and means to cope with them in response to the political will expressed by the elected leaders. The black box perspective makes the theoretical approach that guides the formulation of political will of the elected decision makers irrelevant. For the purpose of force design, before accepting such theory, an explanation of what a black box does is needed.[30]

A problem becomes a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders.[31] This means identifying an issue as a security issue is a political choice based on a decision to conceptualize it in a specific way and often with state centered solutions.[32] The process is intersubjective (socially constructed). For a small nation, because its capacity and capability are restricted, it is also an international consideration. It is expressed through political processes and documents. This means it is influenced by institutions as it is interdepartmental in nature and is influenced by all involved in the drafting and coordination of the documents and decisions. Because of today's wider description of what security means, the use of force is also described differently. Normally the military sector is highly institutionalized and encompasses a number of nominal security functions that are not security issues at all because the military sector is used in political and economic relations (disaster relief, peacekeeping, support to diplomacy). Further the pressure to prevent conflict and shape the environment, meaning the deployment of military forces, causes the multinational environment to call for a new approach or new military forces. Crisis management and interagency cooperation are becoming key words in multinational force projection projects. In building this guidance, the state apparatus including the elected or democratically appointed leaders, administrators and professional area experts have a say, as they do in allocating resources.[33]

A national defense planning and management system should provide complex solutions to complex problems in a rapidly changing environment with resource constraints. The system should be flexible and responsive with a built in mechanism for interagency coordination and cooperation, national and international interagency

interoperability, and careful allocation and prioritization of resources. The minimum concept of state security is limited to military and certain aspects of political security. Currently the analysis provides that capability based planning is the method best suited to the contemporary security environment characterized by VUCA and limited resources.[34] It consists of political guidance that describes the national perception of the security environment, identifies security risks and challenges, and provides guidance for the development of responses and a national defense organization that may implement the response options. Secondly it should develop scenarios to guide contingency planning, identify missions, develop capability requirements, and identify capability gaps, develop solutions to bridge these gaps, and select and approve solutions that will guide further resource allocation.[35]

A state is responsible to provide military security and to that end, as already discussed, an executive national security apparatus must be developed. The modus operandi for such a system is to ensure allocation of limited resources to meet the highest priority challenges. Long, medium and short term planning timeframes must be addressed. Based on the objective of the planning system, it is then divided into capability based and resource based planning. Despite the capability based approach the executive national security apparatus conceptually should use the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) methodology as a set of rules, procedures, and techniques to improve planning to address a medium term concerns. That leads to the hypothesis that the national defense organization uses PPB but also utilizes the capability based approach for the analysis of current security environment and planning relevant response activities in order to design its forces.[36]

Small State Capability Planning Methodology

The need for transforming forces and planning has increased emphasis due to dramatically changed conditions in the new security environment. In this case dramatic means unpredictable, unanticipated challenges that hardly can justify force structures of industrial age warfare. The threat the ambiguous strategic environment poses is a challenge for planning and force development methodologies that are applicable today and acceptable to cost conscious politicians.[37] Threat based planning has changed to objective based planning.[38] The capability based approach to defense planning, allows us to concentrate on wide spectrum of potential opponents, because it deals with uncertainty. The acceptance of this methodology is growing slowly.[39] The US and NATO have already adopted it because it accommodates uncertainties and is flexible and adaptive.[40] In a broader sense this is planning under uncertainty that aims to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances while working within an economically constrained framework.[41]

Capabilities based planning is applicable to the small state.[42] It provides well reasoned justification built on credible contingencies based on capabilities with less dependence on specific threats that normally guide government strategy to defend the country.[43] It has a few preconditions. Defense based policy documents should recognize fundamentals of a country's geopolitical and geostrategic settings. An appreciation of existing and future military capability of the region and alliances should be developed in order to calculate warning times and preparation lead-times. Integrating those two preconditions, a series of contingencies should be developed and national requirements generated. Financial assumptions and data are essential to the process. The process then must provide force development priorities.[44] In this way an approach to define

missions without a link to an implausible threat scenario is developed. A process of force development can then be undertaken in three major stages. First is the development of strategic concepts, second a defense force capability options paper is produced and thirdly a specific capability proposal including major capability requirements is published.[45] As we can see by experience, a top down approach is needed specifically in times of fiscal restriction as experienced by France (as published in its White Book), the United Kingdom (in its second Strategic Defense Review) and today even the USA. Without government endorsed guidance (i.e. policy, strategy, and finance) planning is difficult to execute. Consistent civil and military leadership is needed. An institutional structure to implement decisions is needed, like a Joint Headquarters with adequate staffing, preferably headed by senior military officials to work with the civilian defense force development office.[46] Capability planning methodology consists basically of a conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty, an emphasis on flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness of its capabilities.

Focusing on military capabilities, the operational planning and force development process should look towards the development of those military capabilities necessary to meet a range of operational requirements and tasks specified through political guidance. But in today's guidance the specific threats are unclear, clear cut military responses are rare and the range of potential military tasks is determined more by security commitments than by threats alone. In the context of the mentioned system, military capability is defined as the quantitatively measurable capacity of each structural element of the defense force to perform a given task under a specific condition up to established standards. Each structural element may have more than one capability and

each capability may be carried by more than one structural element. No capability exists independently from the structure - organization, people, platforms, systems and procedures-actually carrying that capability.

Capability planning is essentially an analytical framework for understanding capability needs, options at the level of mission or operation. It allows choosing capability levels and options in an integrated portfolio framework that considers other factors (force management), different types of risk, and economic limitations. It is a solution framework that emphasizes building blocks.[47] Understanding capability needs means recognizing a wide range of potential future threats and building a list of named scenarios that are both specific and generic. The lists of scenarios should accommodate all plausible contingencies that are then analyzed through six categories: political military context, objectives and strategies, forces, force effectiveness, environment, and other model assumptions.[48] Assessing capability options means suggesting alternatives. The emphasis is on operations or missions because these are the critical building block capabilities. They give meaning to goals and provide the means to measure military input and output. A good explanatory analysis is needed in order to evaluate alternatives because of the metrics of strategic and operational level issues and mission.[49] Choosing capability levels and answering how much is enough is done at the end when we establish a budget. That is why every state needs a portfolio and prioritization. Then the analysis needs to meet the real force.[50]

Modularity

People use organizations and the interaction of technology with organizational paradigms to create powerful new military capabilities. This is important because form defines warfare more than numbers or technology. In dispersed mobile warfare,

integrated all arms warfare is the overarching joint operational concept. All arms operations integrate functional capabilities of maneuver, strike, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) and sustainment inside a unified Command and Control (C2) operational framework. However it is important to remember that the enemy is a reactive system. Even the simplest tasks in war are difficult; complex command arrangements involving fragmented authority must be avoided. Geographically dispersed land, air, and sea based operations require a high level of command coherence through technologically and intellectually shared battle space awareness. Taking into account Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and strike weapons, capabilities once found only at the division level must be transferred to lower command echelons and integrated into their operations. Smaller than a division, but larger than a standard brigade, a formation capable of limited independent action that eliminates unnecessary command levels and drives jointness to a much lower level is needed. Small nations should be able to plug in to these formations.[51]

A modular, building block approach to force design and operation is a solution that emphasizes flexibility, adaptivenes and robustness of capabilities.[52] Building blocks are distinguished in four dimensions: units, operations and sub operations, weapon systems and subsystems, and support structures. However, from the comprehensive approach perspective this is not enough. Necessary plug-ins and institutional framework go hand in hand with the theory and practice of enabling modular approach.[53] Special tailoring is done and units are created that never before existed and new types of network and logistics structures are invented. These are not self sustainable parts and

need additional support from larger organizations. There is a bill of additional support to give these building blocks autonomy that must be paid.

In the land warfare domain this suggests the next logical step in force design to be a 5000 to 6000 man formation that combines a command element, fighting power, and supporting structure in a stand alone, mission focused capability package (this solution was advocated in 1997).[54] The joint command element drives Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) plugs to lower levels, compressing the tactical and operational levels to the point where maneuver and strike are integrated at much lower level than current practice. Maneuver, strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and sustainment formations, become clusters of joint combat power that have the capacity for operations on land reminiscent of the way ships operate at sea. In other words the new design is: ready on call, quickly deployable and employable by the joint force commander, adaptable for a range of operations, easily integrated and networked within the joint force, supportable despite distance and dispersion, survivable against any adversary, and trained with other service components. But because the new C2 structure modeled on the Joint Task Force (JTF) command structure is now able to coordinate joint strike, and to extend this to any service formation, it is possible that a module of combat power be deployed in smaller configurations, below the 5000 to 6000 person level, such as 2500, 1100 and even 500. A module can become an augmentation block for allies or others for small scale operations and vice versa. The alliance modules become building blocks for bigger contingencies inside the JTF or can federate with larger created formations too.[55]

The design focus should include all C2, tactical, and support elements. The headquarters must be self contained and capable of receiving subordinate units without augmenting its C2 capabilities. There is a similar requirement for other building blocks. Special attention should be put to compatibility of the C2 because it must be able to work for different levels of headquarters by being capable to receive information and share it with others (joint and multinational interoperability). Maximizing commonality of design and systems and building multifunctional organizations is a specific challenge for the Alliance and its operability standards that small nations should regard as a priority.

Modules in a functional category can vary. Some can be organized at company level, others at platoon, section or team. They can be managed by echelon or function such as C2, battlefield awareness, force application, protection, and focused logistics. For training support and readiness purposes, modular formations will be assigned to specific units of employment. The new philosophy of design allows multiple temporary aggregations under a designated senior unit of employment without designating permanent unity of action. This allows flexibility and rapid tailoring of a precise mix of unit capabilities resulting in a smaller deployable force.[56]

C2 Concerns

The pace varies and in the today's VUCA environment almost every situation is unique.[57] As Levinthal and March argue: "learning from experience involves inferences from information. It involves memory. It involves pooling personal experience with knowledge gained from the experiences of others."[58] Future warfare can always be observed from at least three points of view. These being military technology; information, knowledge, and analysis required for individual decision making; and the structure of combat organizations.[59] But the central problem of organized warfare and

the military forces involved has always been C2. This is an intellectual problem of organizing and gaining access to information, knowledge and understanding, the span of control and hierarchy. In relation to C2, key organizational aspects include hierarchy, coordination, division of labor, and conflict.[60]

French military leaders, around 1760, started dividing armies into self contained permanent strategic units – divisions, then the corps appeared and finally the general staff. In today's western world, without conscription, even a military superpower is discussing brigade combat teams as a building block, or in the United Kingdom a battalion battle group. Much more emphasis is given to the C2 system: equipment, people, and organization. Through institutions and organizations, people impose structure on their interactions to reduce uncertainty about each other's behavior. The complexity of networked systems creates the need for more specialized organizational roles but the move to smaller force structures hinders this. [61]

The organization is an important consideration for analysis of future military operations and structures because it provides the means for people to exercise influence over others. An appropriate combination of tightly coupled organizations (organization structure itself provides the solution to organizational problems in form of decision rules, routines, or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that can be connected with small range of tasks), loosely coupled organizations (flexible forces in contact with the enemy produce better effects) with distributed decision making authority in a structural context without central direction in today's complex environment, and news media type organizations (which assign territorial responsibility and division of labor to synchronize information gathering, assign targets and actions, transmit orders,

apply fires, and receive and integrate battle damage assessment) is needed. The issue of generalist -specialist conflict, staff and information processes not appropriate for military organizations, and informal organizations that are critically important to respond to unanticipated operational problems (identifying, suppressing and mitigating errors) must be addressed and resolved in the organization.[62]

The burden of synchronization and coordination is significant and must be accomplished in a higher headquarters composed of both generalists and specialists.[63] This is due primarily to increasing weapons systems accuracy, mobility and lethality. However, the capability of complex machines and software and the interdependence required to operate them have reduced the slack time between actions and decisions. This slack time has been a valuable buffer among partially autonomous units that allowed people to compensate for errors and respond to enemy initiatives and thus manage the fog of war. So the increased synchronization and coordination burden that drives decision making up is matched by the reduced slack time caused by improved command and control systems which drive decision making down. The reaction has been to increase the complexity of information technology inside lower headquarters while emphasizing interdependence between combat organizations and reach back planning and analysis ones, This adds to the importance of commanders management/control of information.[64] After this discussion of drivers that influence the process we should address practical application of force design in small nations based on lessons learned and the capability limitations of small nations.[65]

Tradeoffs

The decision to move toward modular capability based unit design, nested within joint networks, and enabled by joint expeditionary mindset was made by General

Schoomaker.[66] This was the answer to the question of what is the force supposed to be able to do in a larger collection of mission sets. The proposed factors make sense, to force design of force structure informed by cost versus benefit valuations, for small states. The design can take into account the capacity, or better to say, the availability of resources across time because of the smaller elements that are interoperable with the bigger formation and planners can easily identify risks and mitigations of the detected delta. With the scarce resources and declining defense budget this is a transition from a resource informed strategy to a resource determined strategy.[67]

In designing these modules for a flexible and adaptable force an extremely lean force will require a more specialized approach. The structure will have four key elements: geographic usability, capacity, design and the supporting force readiness model. Technology of the module must be aligned with a particular geographical area, the capacity of the types of modules must reflect the balance between stand alone and potentially pooled forces, the design must achieve a balance between specialized and general purpose forces, and there must be a balance between tiered and cyclic readiness models. The types of modules will be optimized for the lowest level of independent operation. As stated before, the US decided to provide unit autonomy to brigade combat teams and give them some division level enablers. Everything else is pooled.

In design the more specific a force is, the less adaptable the formations become. General purpose forces are designed to provide an acceptable solution to unforeseen circumstances and add capacity not present in specialized units because they can quickly adapt to new mission set (for example an artillery battalion providing convoy

security). Small nations have to consider investing in specialized units that accomplish niche roles and that are interoperable so they can plug into larger coalition or alliance forces. These specialized units have validity also because of the integrated joint command structure they are able to support, or plug into joint enablers, in order to participate in functions of the higher level command and decision making process. The Joint staff must collaborate as a flat organization in a many to many environment as said by General Ham.[68] These retain the capability and knowledge of joint warfare and usability of force.

The army organizational design for ground combat forces has always been between totally fixed structures and totally ad hoc organizations. The challenge is to maintain the advantage of one (deployment, sustainment, and planning) while providing opportunities for the other to meet specific tasks. The modular brigade combat team that represents the US army building block for force projection that can be rapidly packaged into lethal force for employment was called a unit of action as described by Colonel Bonin and Lieutenant Colonel Crisco.[69] The methodology used was the process of force tailoring, which is arraying forces through task organization of units to meet specific mission requirements or constraints. This is central for the organization and employment of units of action in new units of employment. Planners can draw and create scaled forces to be committed. Modular building blocks are drawn from the pool of forces. The unit of employment does not have a fixed structure. The tailoring depends on the creation of a modular, standing organization, which includes maneuver and non maneuver units. The stationing and readiness concept influences the structure. Meaning that units are associated with one or more headquarters and the relationship is

not necessarily linked directly to unit stationing, or unit and garrison relationships. In order to rapidly tailor units of engagement, modularity requires self contained organizations that can plug and unplug from unit formations with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A special consideration of small nations must be the training approach and institutional army and garrison support.[70]

Summary

Small states make a decision to be neutral or aligned based on past experiences. These experiences make it possible to understand the design and character of the armed forces in being. Today in the interconnected security environment, security itself is a social construct. Security and defense are not the same and compete for some of the same resources. For small nations, because of capacity and capability restrictions, an international solution can be necessary. Political reasons drive the number of security functions that have to be fulfilled by military capabilities (support to diplomacy, disaster relief, and peacekeeping). Crisis management and interagency cooperation are becoming key words in multinational force projection projects that drive force design requirements. Culture plays a role in using force and thus in designing capabilities. Capability planning methodology is the currently preferred national and alliance defense planning process to provide complex solutions to complex problems. It is an analytical tool.

A mix of military and non military instruments is and will be applied to most situations. The military instrument will play a joint approach to problem solving. Its focus is on flexible command and balanced force structures with capabilities able to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security tasks for land forces that constitute the majority of small nation's capabilities. The uniqueness of each situation and

because wars and conflicts are conducted at four levels-political, strategic, theatre, and tactical-with each level sitting within the context of the others, mission command integrates all the other war fighting functions.[71] The modular, building block approach to force design and operation is a solution that emphasizes flexibility, adaptivenes and robustness of capabilities.[72]

Force design is an essential tool to counter uncertainty in conflict and crises, because it can create options and reduce risk. It provides the means to comprehensively direct military power. In our century, the force design process creates scalable building blocks, structured and equipped for dispersed mobile warfare inside an integrated maneuver-strike-ISR-sustainment complex. Trends show us that integrated functions and capabilities across not only services but also nations, eliminate unneeded overhead, are less expensive to operate and maintain, and are likely to be more lethal.[73] Five main drivers suggest this conclusion. First the absence of mass mobilization. Second precision effect kinetic and non kinetic sources to be used give us opportunity to target and strike from a distance. Third integrative command is essential to conduct war fighting operations. Fourth conditions for dispersed mobile warfare do not eliminate the close fight in ground combat operations (war among people) where mines, rocket propelled grenades, machineguns, mortars, chemical agents, barbed wire, and air defense systems are still effective despite long distance precision strike, and networked systems, which cannot replace killing power or organic survivability of the armed forces especially in close combat. Fifth surprise is still attainable and the fog of war persists to the advantage of small power. Fewer and smarter people with

intelligent technology can accomplish more than masses of troops with brute force have in the past.

What better words to conclude than this paraphrase of Koehan: if Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they have great utility.[74]

Endnotes

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